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CASE COMMENT
SEX MEETS THE CITY: LOWERING A CITY'S EVIDENTIARY
BURDEN ON ZONING ORDINANCES
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002)
Rebecca Shwayri"

Petitioner, City of Los Angeles, enacted a policy preventing the
establishment or maintenance of more than one adult entertainment
business in the same building.' The purpose of the policy was to lower
rates of prostitution, robbery, assault, and theft associated with high
concentrations of adult businesses.2 Respondents, two adult bookstores
that operated combined bookstores and arcades in the same building,
challenged the policy, asserting that it violated the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment.3 In justifying the policy, Petitioner relied upon a
1977 study conducted by theLos Angeles Police Department indicating
that crime rates grew much faster in Hollywood, which had the highest
concentration of adult businesses, than in other areas.4 The District Court
for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor
of Respondents, finding that Petitioner did not offer evidence to

* I dedicate this comment to my parents, Dr. Ernest and Joan Shwayri. I also would like
to thank my advisor, Elenore Klingler, for her helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 431 (2002) (plurality
opinion). Petitioner adopted two separate policies; the disputed policy in this case is Los Angeles
Municipal Code § 12.70(C). Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.70(C) prohibits "the establishment
or maintenance of more than one adult entertainment business in the same building." L.A., CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 12.70(C) (1983). Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.70(B)(17) states that an adult
entertainment business is an "adult arcade, bookstore, cabaret, motel, theater, or massage parlor"
and each of these businesses "shall constitute a separate adult entertainment business even if
operated in conjunction with another adult entertainment business at the same establishment."
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 431 (plurality opinion) (quoting L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE
§ 12.70(B)(17) (1983)).
2. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 430 (plurality opinion). Initially, Petitioner's policy
prohibited "the establishment, substantial enlargement, or transfer of ownership of an adult arcade,
bookstore, cabaret, motel, theater, or massage parlor or a place for sexual encounters within 1,000
feet of another... enterprise or within 500 feet of any religious institution, school, or public park."
Id. (plurality opinion) (citing L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.70(C) (1978)). Petitioners later realized
that there was a loophole in the policy which allowed separate adult businesses to operate in the
same building. Id. at 431 (plurality opinion). Subsequently, Petitioners amended the ordinance to
prohibit adult businesses from operating under the same roof. Id. (plurality opinion).
3. Id. at 429. Respondents sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive and declaratory relief.
Id. (plurality opinion).
4. See id. at 430 (plurality opinion).
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demonstrate that its prohibition was necessary to further a compelling
governmental interest. 5 Petitioner appealed and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
and in reversing the appellate court's decision, HELD, that Petitioner
could draw inferences from a police department study correlating crime
patterns with concentrations of adult businesses.7
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech ...

."'

Courts have traditionally held that

sexual material cannot be completely suppressed, but may be regulated
through a content-neutral restriction so long as the restriction's aim is to
suppress the secondary effects of speech,9 without significantly curbing the
message itself. 0 Beginning with Young v. AmericanMini Theatres, Inc., "
the Supreme Court advocated a two-tiered approach to First Amendment
speech in which sexually oriented speech received less First Amendment
protection than other forms.' 2
In Young, the Court examined the constitutionality of a zoning
ordinance which prohibited adult theaters from being located within 1,000
feet of another adult theater or within 500 feet of a residential area.' 3 In
holding that the ordinance did not violate the First Amendment, 4 the Court
reasoned that the interest in protecting erotic material was of a lesser

5. See id at 429 (plurality opinion). The district court found that the Los Angeles ordinance
was a content-based regulation and applied strict scrutiny. Id.(plurality opinion).
6. Id. (plurality opinion). In affirming the district court, the court of appeals held that
petitioners failed to present evidence that demonstrated a nexus between adult establishments in
the same building and crime. Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 723-26
(9th Cir. 2000), rev 'dsub.nom. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002)
(plurality opinion). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit Court concluded that it did not have to decide
whether the ordinance was content-based or content-neutral because no factual nexus existed to
show whether the ordinance would further a governmental interest. Id. at 723-24.
7. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 430 (plurality opinion).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. In this case, secondary effects are crime, prostitution, robbery, and assaults that are
caused by the adult bookstores. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986). The Los Angeles study at issue concluded that robberies increased three times faster and
prostitution fifteen times faster in Hollywood, which had a higher concentration of adult bookstores
than in other parts of the city. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 435 (plurality opinion).
10. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 445 (Kennedy, J., concurring). A zoning ordinance is
constitutional "if it is likely to cause a significant decrease in secondary effects and a trivial
decrease in the quantity of speech." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
I1. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
12. Id. at 70; see also Harvard Law Review Association, Restrictive Zoning of Adult
Theaters, 100 HARV. L. REV. 190, 199 (1986). "The Court's American Mini Theatres holding
makes it clear that some members of the Court believe that sexually explicit speech should receive
less protection than other kinds of speech." Id.
13. Young, 427 U.S. at 52.
14. Id.at 63.
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magnitude than the interest in protecting political debate.m" While sexual
material cannot be completely suppressed, the state could legitimately use
the content of these materials as a basis for placing them in a different
category of regulation. 6 The Court also indicated that there was a strong
factual basis for the contention that the zoning ordinance at issue would
prevent crime and preserve the quality of urban life.' 7 The Court, therefore,
concluded that the city was entitled to draw a distinction between adult
theaters and other kinds of theaters without violating the government's
obligation of neutrality."8 Ultimately, cities should be given a reasonable
opportunity to experiment with solutions to problems.19
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,2° the Supreme Court left
in tact the reasoning from Young, but fashioned a new rule.2' The
respondents brought suit against the City of Renton seeking a permanent
injunction against enforcement of a restriction which prohibited adult
motion picture theaters from being located within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone.22 The Court held that zoning ordinances meant to combat
the undesirable secondary effects of adult establishments should be
reviewed under the standards applicable to content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions.23 Because such ordinances are aimed at the secondary
effects of the speech and not at the message itself, the ordinances are not
content-based. 24 The Court concluded that the appropriate test is whether

15. See id. at 70 (plurality opinion). The Court made the point that "few of us would march
our sons and daughters offto war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities'
exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Id.
16. Id. at 70-71 (plurality opinion).
17. See id. at 71 n.34 (plurality opinion). The Court cited the city's factual determination that
a concentration of adult theaters results in crime. Id. (plurality opinion).
18. Id. at 70-71 (plurality opinion).
19. Id. at 71 (plurality opinion). The Court stated that "the city's interest in attempting to
preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect." Id. (plurality opinion).
In Young, the Court began a pattern of paying deference to municipalities that repeats itself in City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M, and the instant case. See id.
(plurality opinion). See generally City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986);
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535
U.S. 425 (2002) (plurality opinion).
20. 475 U.S. at 41.
21. Id. at 50.
22. Id. at 44. The ordinance prohibited any adult theater from locating "within 1,000 feet of
any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of
any school." Id. An adult theater was defined as "[an] enclosed building used for presenting motion
picture films, video cassettes, cable television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or
[characterized] by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'specified sexual
activities' or 'specified anatomical areas' . . . for observation by patrons therein." Id.
23. Id. at 49.
24. See id.
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the ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and
allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.25

In Renton, the Court also lowered the burden that a city must prove in
order to show that a restriction serves a substantial governmental interest.26
The Court indicated that a city could rely upon studies conducted by other
cities so long as the evidence that the city utilizes is "reasonably believed
to be relevant to the problem" that is addressed." New studies by the city
are not necessary in order for the city to meet its evidentiary burden.2"
The Court concluded the government's interest in preserving "the
quality of urban life is one that must be accorded . . . respect. "29
Accordingly, the Court held that the zoning ordinance was a valid response
to problems created by adult theaters.3" The interest in preserving the
quality of urban life was directly served by prohibiting adult theaters near
residential areas.3 '
In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M,32 the Court further lowered the
evidentiary requirements necessary to prove whether a regulation furthers
a substantial governmental interest.33 The ordinance in Erie made it an

offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a state of
nudity. 4 To comply with the regulation, dancers at a nude erotic

25. Id.at 50.
26. Seeid.at51.
27. Id.
at 51-52. The City Council held public meetings, examined the experiences of Seattle,
and received a report from the City Attorney's Office on the issue of zoning. Id. at 44. The evidence
from Seattle involved extensive testimony on the history and effect of zoning ordinances. Id. at 51.
In addition, the fact that Renton chose a different method to address the problem than Seattle was
insignificant: "Seattle's choice of a different remedy to combat the secondary effects of adult
theaters does not call into question either Seattle's identification of those secondary effects or the
relevance of Seattle's experience to Renton." Id.at 52. However, Justice Brennan reasoned in a
dissent that because Renton failed to adopt Seattle's method, Seattle's data provided no basis to
assess the effectiveness of the Renton ordinance. Id. at 61-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Id.at 51-52. The Court noted that
[t]he First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance,
to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated
by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.
Id.This is a step down from Young because the city in that case conducted an independent factual
determination of its own. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
29. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion)).
30. Id.at 54.
31. See id.at 54-55.
32. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
33. Id.at 296 (plurality opinion).
34. Id.at 284. Ordinance 75-1994 states:
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establishment were required to wear pasties and a G-string." In
determining whether the regulation furthered a substantial governmental
interest, the Court noted that the ban directly targeted the harmful
secondary effects associated with nude dancing. 6 Even more important,
the city did not need to conduct new studies or produce new evidence so
long as the evidence that the city relied upon was reasonably relevant to
the problem being addressed." The Court noted that it was permissible for
the city to rely exclusively on Renton and Young as evidence because the
nude dancing in Erie was similar to the adult bookstores in those cases.3
Erie could use Renton and Young for the proposition that adult businesses
cause secondary effects.3 In short, the Court expanded Renton's holding
by stating that regular analogizing from similar cases involving sexual
content would be enough for the city to meet its evidentiary burden. °

1.A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place: a. engages in sexual
intercourse[,] b. engages in deviate sexual intercourse as defined by the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code[,] c. appears in a state of nudity, or d. fondles the
genitals of himself, herself or another person commits Public Indecency, a
Summary Offense.
Id. (quoting ERIE, PA., ORDINANCE 75-1994 (1994) (codified as Article 711 of the Codified
Ordinances of the City of Erie)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 300-01 (plurality opinion). The Court determined that the ordinance in Erie was
content-neutral and applied intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 296. However, the Court also noted that
the test announced in UnitedStates v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), was applicable rather than the
test announced in Renton because the speech in Erie was a form of expressive, symbolic speech.
Erie, 529 U.S. at 296. The test from O'Brien states that a
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 377. Both O'Brienand Renton are tests applying an intermediate scrutiny standard and
both tests require that the regulation further an important governmental interest. See O'Brien,391
U.S. at 377; Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
37. Erie, 529 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion). The Court also noted that Erie relied partially
on its own findings. Id. at 297 (plurality opinion). Furthermore, the city council members had firsthand knowledge of the problem and this knowledge also could be used to justify the ordinance. Id.
at 297-98 (plurality opinion). The city's experts should be presumed credible in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary. Id. at 298 (plurality opinion).
38. Id. at 296-97 (plurality opinion).
39. Id. at 297 (plurality opinion).
40. Id. (plurality opinion). The Court's reasoning in Erie represents a further drop from the
standard in Renton. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 4 1. Renton used evidence from Seattle which provided
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The instant Court inherited this deferential attitude towards city
regulations. Much like the Court in Renton and Erie, the plurality in the
instant case applied a deferential standard towards the evidence supplied
by Petitioner and further lowered the evidentiary burden municipalities
must meet.4 ' While the Los Angeles study only examined concentrations
of adult businesses within a certain area and not a concentration of
businesses within a single establishment,42 the instant Court found that
Petitioner drew reasonable inferences from the study.43 The instant Court
reasoned that a concentration of adult operations in a particular location
draws consumers and these consumers attract or create criminal activity."
Having a number of adult businesses within a single building attracts the
same clientele as having several distinct businesses, just as mini-malls
attract crowds of consumers.45
While a city must prove that the ordinance furthers the governmental
interest, it does not have to provide evidence that disproves every other
theory inapposite to its own. 46 The instant Court explained that
Respondents had two avenues available to cast doubt on Petitioner's
rationale. 47 Respondents could demonstrate that the evidence failed to
support Petitioner's contention; 48 alternatively, Respondents could provide
evidence that disputes Petitioner's findings.49 In concluding its analysis,
the instant Court shifted the evidentiary burden to Respondents.5"

a causal link between adult bookstores and secondary effects. In Erie, the Court reasoned that
Renton and Young, which were zoning cases involving adult bookstores, could be used by other
cities to make analogies in a case that involved clothing nude dancers. Erie, 529 U.S. at 297
(plurality opinion).
41. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 440 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor delivered the
plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined. Id.
at 428 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 444
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 430 (plurality opinion).
43. See id. (plurality opinion). Cf Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973)
(holding that a legislature could draw reasonable inferences between antisocial behavior and
obscene material).
44. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 436 (plurality opinion).
45. Id. (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 437 (plurality opinion). The Court stated that a city may not rely on unreliable data
or reasoning. Id. at 438 (plurality opinion). The evidence must "fairly support the municipality's
rationale." Id. (plurality opinion).
47. See id. at 438-39 (plurality opinion).
48. Id. (plurality opinion).
49. Id. at 439 (plurality opinion).
50. See id. at 438-39 (plurality opinion). The Court concluded that deference must be paid
to Petitioner because cities have more first-hand knowledge of secondary effects than does the
judiciary. Id. at 440 (plurality opinion). The deference paid to municipalities in Young, Renton,
Erie, and the instant case is the "product of a careful balance between competing interests." Id.
(plurality opinion). The First Amendment zoning cases illustrate that the Court often balances in
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Justice Souter's dissent strongly criticized the plurality's reasoning,
finding that Petitioner failed to show that two bookstores in the same
building, which are isolated from other adult businesses, increase crime
and other negative secondary effects.5" The Los Angeles study simply
treats combined bookstores as a single entity and draws no conclusions
that individual stores separated from other businesses increase secondary
effects.52 Hence, the dissent concluded that Petitioner failed to meet the
evidentiary burden established in Renton because the study was not
reasonably related to the problem being addressed. 3
The instant Court's holding substantially changed the evidentiary
burden that a municipality must meet in order to justify a zoning
restriction. Beginning with Renton, the Court reasoned that cities could
reasonably rely upon evidence produced from other municipalities. 4 So
long as the evidence produced by other cities causally linked adult material
to secondary effects, another city could later utilize this evidence if the
same problem was being addressed.55 The Court confirmed this reasoning
in Erie and further lowered the evidentiary burden by holding that cities
could simply analogize from similar cases involving sexual content.5 6 In
the instant case, the Court finally tipped the scales fully in favor of
municipalities by allowing Petitioner to utilize evidence that failed to
provide a causal link between adult businesses located within the same
building and secondary effects.57 A city may not only analogize from past
cases, but may also use evidence to draw inferences and assumptions
without a strong empirical basis.5"
Even more significant, the instant Court's reasoning actually shifted the
evidentiary burden from municipalities to adult businesses.59 The instant
Court's holding creates a situation whereby a city's general citation to

favor of municipalities.
51. Id. at 459-60 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter wrote the dissenting opinion in which
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined, and in which Justice Breyer joined as to Part II. Id. at 453
(Souter, J.,
dissenting).
52. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting).
53. Id.at 459-60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
54. Renton, 475 U.S. 51-52.
55. Id.
56. Erie, 529 U.S. at 297 (plurality opinion). The Court noted that the "nude dancing at
Kandyland is of the same character as the adult entertainment at issue in Renton." Id. at 296-97
(plurality opinion).
57. Alameda Books, 53 5 U.S. at 459-60 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter writes that "the
government has not shown that bookstores containing viewing booths, isolated from other adult
establishments, increase crime or produce other negative secondary effects in surrounding
neighborhoods." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
58. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 438-39 (plurality opinion).
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another city's evidence is assumed to be correct60 Adult businesses must
now fend for themselves by either casting doubt on a municipality's
presumptively correct evidence or by supplying alternative evidence that
disputes the city's findings. 6' It is highly unlikely that the first of these
venues, casting doubt on the evidence, is actually feasible for adult
businesses. In Renton and Erie, the Court stated that cities could
reasonably conclude that adult businesses cause secondary effects. 62 This
presumption, which now seems irrefutable in light of the instant Court's
analysis, will make it impracticable for adult businesses to refute evidence.
On the other hand, an adult business would be hard-pressed to provide
an alternative evidentiary analysis. Adult businesses do not have the same
resources as cities. A lone adult business which is forced to litigate a First
Amendment case may not have the time or money available to conduct the
type of long-term study needed to overcome the presumptions of Erie and
Renton. Thus, the instant Court's analysis will likely make it easier to put
adult bookstores out of business entirely.63
The long-term impact of this policy is that cities will use the contentneutral Renton framework to justify a content-based restriction. 6 The
content-neutral Renton framework, which provides an intermediate level
of scrutiny, should be used for those zoning restrictions which are
primarily aimed at reducing secondary effects.65 In contrast, strict scrutiny
is utilized for zoning restrictions which are enacted because of the content
of the message. 66 The result of the instant Court's analysis is to extend a
lower level of scrutiny toward those restrictions which are actually aimed
at the content of the message. In short, cities will be able to justify the
zoning of all adult businesses by simply citing to the Court's reasoning in
Renton, Erie, and the instant case with secondary effects only a pretext.

60. Id. (plurality opinion). In the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor rejects the Ninth
Circuit's implicit assumption that the city is required to prove that its theory is the only one that can
explain the evidence. Id. at 437 (plurality opinion). Such a standard would be too high for
municipalities. Id. at 438 (plurality opinion). The evidentiary analysis performed by a city must
simply be reasonable in order to be valid. Id. (plurality opinion). In other words, the city's citation
to evidence is presumed valid. See id.
61. Id. at 438-39 (plurality opinion).
62. Erie, 529 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion); Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.
63. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 466 (Souter, J., dissenting).
64. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 12, at 195. Some analysts suggest that
the Court departed from precedent in Renton by holding that ordinances which actually target the
content of speech while also addressing secondary effects are constitutional. Id.
65. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
66. See Erie, 529 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion). The Court notes that a regulation that is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression is content-neutral. Id. (plurality opinion). Therefore,
a regulation that targets content and is enacted to suppress content is content-based. Id. (plurality
opinion).
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The instant Court's reasoning may ultimately create a greater
likelihood of viewpoint discrimination.67 The risk of viewpoint
discrimination is combated if municipalities produce evidence
demonstrating a causal link between adult businesses and crime.68
Reviewing courts should be on guard when a municipality fails to provide
a factual nexus, but uses only common sense to justify a restriction on free
speech.69 As Justice Souter wrote in his dissent, common sense may be
enough to justify a restriction in some instances, but always substituting
common sense for concrete evidence is bad policy, especially when cities
can readily access empirical data.7"
The instant Court also may have overlooked facts which would justify
a holding in favor of Respondents. The Court in Renton and Erie
previously accepted that concentrations of adult businesses in a
neighborhood would increase crime."' While this assumption is reasonable,
it does not necessarily support Petitioner's proposition that two adult
businesses in the same building will increase crime.72 The bookstores
involved in the instant case are not two separate businesses that have been
shown to create secondary effects if concentrated in a single area.73 Rather,

67. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at457 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Souter reasons that the entire Renton framework should be rethought in order to avoid confusion
between content-based and content-neutral restrictions. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Sexually
oriented speech should be evaluated under a "content correlated" scheme rather than the contentneutral Renton framework. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). By calling sexually oriented speech "content
correlated" rather than content-neutral, the Court would be less likely to endorse content-based
restrictions using a content-neutral framework. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter
reasons that one of the greatest risks of the plurality's opinion is that a content-neutral framework,
which imposes a lower burden on a municipality, would be used to justify a content-based
restriction, which typically requires strict scrutiny. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter,
however, does not propose the elements of a content correlated test. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor reasoned that there
was no group that Los Angeles could have studied to produce an evidentiary link between multi-use
adult establishments and crime. Id. at 440 (plurality opinion). The city was unable to compare
multi-use adult establishments to single-use establishments. Id. (plurality opinion). Hence, Justice
O'Connor concludes that Justice Souter's framework would substantially increase the evidentiary
burden on municipalities. Id. at 441 (plurality opinion).
69. Id. at 459 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted that one way to
protect adult businesses would be to force Petitioner to prove that the ordinance would not
negatively impact speech. Id. at 449-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Intermediate scrutiny focuses
on the secondary effects of speech, but a regulation must not curb the secondary effects by
suppressing the message itself. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Ultimately, Petitioner must prove that
businesses which are forced to break up are more likely to move than shut down. Id. at 451
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 463 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the bookstores in the instant case combine selling and viewing activities
that complement each other and together these activities do not constitute
an adult mini-mall. 4
Petitioner's policy may ultimately break up all adult businesses that are
housed in the same building.75 The policy could have two contradictory
effects. 6 Ironically, contrary to the intent of the policy, the zoning
ordinance could multiply the number of adult businesses in Los Angeles
area. 77 By not allowing adult businesses to be housed in the same building,
adult businesses could multiply and disperse throughout the city.
Alternatively, the restriction may be an effective method to put some adult
establishments out of business entirely.7 s Forcing two businesses to break
up means that one of the businesses will be forced to relocate and pay
higher expenses. 79 The plurality, thus, may have endorsed a content-based
restriction and missed an opportunity to protect First Amendment rights.

74. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 466 (Souter, J., dissenting).

76. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy contends, however, that forcing adult

businesses to break up may actually aid them. Id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring). If the businesses
are broken up, then secondary effects are reduced. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). When secondary
effects are reduced, the neighborhood is generally safer and people are more willing to shop there.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Ultimately, however, Justice Kennedy's analysis is conclusory
because it uses the evidence provided by Petitioner to justify the same result while simply
advocating one more step in the analysis. Justice Kennedy's analysis does not compel the
introduction of further evidence. Justice Kennedy reasons that if the city's first ordinance was
lawful, then the second is too. Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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